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VALUING DERIVATIVE SUITS IN MERGERS OF FOOD AND
NATURAL RESOURCE CORPORATIONS THROUGH ANALYZING
THE MASSEY AND ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES MERGER:
METHODS OF ENSURING CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND
MAXIMIZING SHAREHOLDER VALUE
ROBERT PROUDFOOT*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 5, 2010, twenty-nine Massey Energy miners' were killed
by a massive methane and coal dust explosion in the Upper Big Branch coal
mine disaster in West Virginia.2 This disaster was the result of multiple
preventable safety failures.3 Not only was this the largest coal mining
disaster in recent memory,4 but the incident raised questions about
corporate accountability,s the effectiveness of federal regulatory standards,
* Senior Staff, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, AND NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW, 2012-2013; B.A. 2006, Vanderbilt University; J.D. expected May 2013, University of Kentucky.
' See J. DAVITY MCATEER ET AL., UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE APRIL 5, 2010, ExPLOSION: A
FAILURE OF BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICES 4-5 (2011), available at
http://www.nttc.edu/programs&projects/minesafety/disasterinvestigations/upperbigbranch/UpperBigBra
nchReport.pdf (explaining that the miners were technically employed by Performance Coal Company, a
subsidiary of Massey Energy). See generally, e.g., In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL
2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (holding that the Mine Safety and Health Administration, West
Virginia Governor's Independent Investigation Report, derivative suits, and merger agreements refer to
these miners and the incident as part of Massey and its responsibility).
2 Ian Urbina, No Survivors Found After West Virginia Mine Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/10/us/l0westvirginia.html.
Upper Big Branch Report, NAT'L TECH. TRANSFER CTR., http://www.nttc.edu/
programs&projects/minesafety/disasterinvestigations/upperbigbranch/conclusion.asp (last visited Oct. 9,
2012) ("The story of Upper Big Branch is a cautionary tale of hubris. A company that was a towering
presence in the Appalachian coalfields operated its mines in a profoundly reckless manner, and 29 coal
miners paid with their lives for the corporate risk-taking. The April 5, 2010, explosion was not
something that happened out of the blue, an event that could not have been anticipated or prevented. It
was, to the contrary, a completely predictable result for a company that ignored basic safety standards
and put too much faith in its own mythology.").
4 Mine Safety & Health Admin., Historical Data on Mine Disasters in the United States,
U.S. DEP'T LABOR, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/FactSheets/MSHAFCT8.HTM (last visited Oct.
9,2012).
5See Ken Ward Jr., Taking Big Coal to Task is Dificult, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Apr. 2,
2011), http://wvgazette.com/News/montcoal/201104020982 ("'Enforcement doesn't reach into the
boardroom,' said Davitt McAteer, a longtime mine safety advocate who ran the U.S. Mine Safety and
Health Administration during the Clinton administration and is conducting an independent investigation
of the Upper Big Branch disaster.").
6 See McATEER ET AL., supra note 1, at 77, 88-89.
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and the impact of a merger when a corporation is in a crisis. Accusations
of negligence and criminal wrongdoing led to federal regulatory scrutiny,
wrongful death tort claims on behalf of the victims, and derivative
shareholder suits against the directors and officers. As a reaction to the
disaster and its fallout, Massey Energy's (Massey) stock price plummeted
and Alpha Natural Resources (Alpha) opportunistically offered to take over
the beleaguered company in a part cash and part share merger.9
Shareholders, concerned that the merger would alter their status as
shareholders and thus impede their derivative actions due to loss of
standing under Delaware General Corporation Law § 259(a),10 sued for
injunctive relief in the Delaware Court of Chancery to block the merger."
After reviewing the shareholders' request to block the merger, Judge Strine
declined to issue the injunction and allowed the merger to continue,12 thus
rendering the Massey shareholder suit against its corporate managers
moot.13 In December 2011, Alpha settled pending litigation regarding the
deceased miners and federal regulators for $209 million.14 Each deceased
miner's family received $1.5 million, 5 and the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) issued a fine of $10.8 million, its largest fine ever
against a coal mining company.16 Don Blankenship, CEO of Massey since
2000,'1 stepped down the month following the disaster and left the
company with a $12 million severance package.' 8 In summary, Massey had
one of the largest coal mining accidents in history, and Alpha's subsequent
purchase of Massey effectively removed Massey shareholder standing for
derivative claims against Massey corporate management.
See Kevin LaCroix, In a Must-Read Opinion, Delaware Court Rejects Bid to Block Massey
Merger, D & 0 DIARY (June 2, 2011), http://www.dandodiary.com/2011/06/articles/shareholders-
derivative-litiga/in-a-mustread-opinion-delaware-court-rejects-bid-to-block-massey-merger/.
In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at*l (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011).
, Id.
"o DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (West 2012).
"In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *2.
2 Id. at *31.
13 See id. at *2 (explaining that a double derivative suit would still be available to Alpha
shareholders, which will be discussed later).
14 Sabrina Tavernise & Clifford Kraus, Mine Owner Will Pay $209 Million in Blast That
Killed 29 Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/us/mine-owner-to-
pay-200-million-in-west-virginia-explosion.html? r-2&pagewanted=all.
5 Id.
16 Steven Allen Adams, Alpha to Pay 209 Million over Coal Mine Disaster, BEAVERTON
POST (Dec. 6, 2011), http://beavertonpost.com/news/story.cfm?bid=5910721.
17 Brian K. Sullivan, Karen Freifeld & Margaret Cronin Fisk, Massey Energy: The
Accountant of Coal, Bus. WK. (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/magazinel
content/10 17/b4175048798671.htm ("[Blankenship] has been chairman and CEO of Massey Energy
since 2000 and head of A.T. Massey Coal, a wholly owned subsidiary, since 1992.").
18 Erich Schwartzel, Massey's Blankenship Back in Business?, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrTE
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/business/news/masseys-blankenship-back-in-
business-224032/.
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Using the Massey merger with Alpha as a guidepost, this Note
reviews the impact of mergers on derivative actions for natural resource and
agricultural companies and proposes that derivative actions are valuable
assets of corporations and should be explicitly and appropriately priced in
mergers.19 Additionally, a potential conflict of interest is present when a
merger occurs during a pending derivative action because a merger
dissolves pending derivative claims against corporate management and the
board of directors.20 While the Delaware Court did not find evidence of
fraud in the Massey merger, such a risk of fraud exists, and corporations
should take action to mitigate directors' conflicts of interest and mispricing
of derivative claim assets.2 1 Prior case law states that all corporate assets
should be considered in a merger 2 2 and a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation can have real monetary value.23 The logical combination of
these two concepts yields the focus of this Note. To minimize potential
breaches of fiduciary duties during mergers and to maximize shareholder
value, successfully pleaded but pending derivative actions should be
specifically valued into the purchase price when a corporation merges to
compensate existing shareholders for the transfer of control of the
derivative action.24 Without including pending derivative actions when
pricing assets, there is a reduced incentive for the purchasing party to
continue valid shareholder derivative suits as part of recouping its purchase
costs.
II. THE MASSEY DISASTER AND MERGER
To understand the importance of the shareholder derivative suit,
this Note will review the circumstances of the Massey coal mine disaster,
its merger with Alpha, and subsequent investigations regarding Massey's
corporate culture. During its own investigation, MSHA determined that the
19 J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 673, 686 n.62 (2008).
20 See In re Walt Disney Co., 731 A.2d 342, 354 (Del. Ch. 1998) (stating if a director
receives a material benefit not shared by shareholders, then there is a potential claim for breach of the
duty of loyalty), aff'd in part, rev d in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); see
also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) ("[I]n determining demand futility the Court of
Chancery in the proper exercise of its discretion must decide whether, under the particularized facts
alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the
challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment."), overruled
sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
21 See In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at*2 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011) (explaining that the disposition of the case would be different had fraud been present).
22 See id. at *15-16.
23 See id.; see also Bomarko, Inc. v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., No. 13052, 1994 WL 198726, at
*3 (Del. Ch. May 16, 1994).
24 See In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *21-25 (applying the underlying theory of Judge
Strine's analysis for the Massey merger, however, the Delaware court should have required the
derivative suit to be priced as an asset).
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massive coal and methane dust explosion that caused the catastrophic
Upper Big Branch disaster was "the result of a series of basic safety
violations at [the mine] and [was] entirely preventable."25 On April 5, 2010,
lapses in safety procedures allowed an unsafe and unlawful buildup of
methane gas within the mine.26 The longwall shearer, a machine used in
coal extraction, was in disrepair, operating "with worn bits and missing
water sprays, creating an ignition source for methane on the longwall."27
Massey allowed significant amounts of float coal dust, coal dust, and loose
coal to accumulate in the mine.28 This coal dust became the fuel for a
massive blast throughout the mine after the coal shearer's sparks ignited a
small amount of methane.2 9
As a result, MSHA found that Massey's corporate management
failed to perform mine examinations and remedy known safety violations;
kept two sets of books to conceal hazardous conditions from regulators;
intimidated miners to prevent the reporting of safety hazards; failed to
provide adequate safety training to workers; and established a regular
practice of providing advance notice of inspections to hide safety
violations.30 Upper Big Branch's head of security, Hughie Stover, was
convicted in federal court for lying to federal investigators and giving
advance warning of safety inspections. 3 ' As of the writing of this Note, the
Justice Department has successfully reached a plea bargain with at least one
mid-level executive, Gary May, and is still investigating criminal charges
against other members of Massey's management.32
Even before the Upper Big Branch disaster, Massey's corporate
culture under CEO Don Blankenship maintained an antagonistic
relationship with federal mine safety regulators because the corporation
continuously appealed their most serious violations. In 2009 alone,
Massey appealed thirty-seven of fifty violations as a strategy to delay
stricter federal law enforcement that began in 2006.34 From 2000 to 2009,
MSHA cited Massey for 62,923 violations with 25,612 labeled "significant
25 NORMAN G. PAGE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION: FATAL UNDERGROUND MINE EXPLOSION 2 (2010), available at
http://www.msha.gov/Fatals/2010/UBB/FTLl0c0331noappx.pdf.26 Id at3.
28 id.
29 d
29 id.
30 Id. at 4-6.
31 Ken Ward Jr., Ex-Upper Big Branch Security Director Found Guilty, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/201 110260060.
32 Howard Berkes, Massey Mine Boss Pleads Guilty as Feds Target Execs, NPR (Mar. 29,
2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/03/29/149639345/massey-mine-boss-pleads-guilty-
as-feds-target-execs.
3 Gardiner Harris & Erik Eckholm, Mines Fight Strict Laws by Filing More Appeals, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 6,2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/us/07company.html? r-1.
3 Id.
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and substantial."35 Massey also had the highest proposed fines for safety
violations, $49.9 million; $15 million more than any other coal operator. 6
An American University School of Communication study found that "no
U.S. coal company had a worse fatality record than Massey Energy Co.,
even before an explosion at its Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia
killed 29 on April 5 . . . . The hazards that caused the explosion at the
mine were not isolated, but part of a string of safety violations that shaped
Massey's corporate culture. After former governor of West Virginia Joe
Manchin requested an independent report of the incident,38 it was
discovered that many of Massey's employees believed that Massey's stated
company policy of putting safety first was just a slogan, and that Massey's
true priority was coal production.39 Even Alpha had concerns about
Massey's focus on production rather than miner safety and regulatory
compliance when it was considering a merger.40
III. MASSEY SHAREHOLDERS SUE DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES FOR
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
With twenty-nine miners dead, a forty-percent decline in Massey
stock, and the general public and federal regulators in an uproar over
negligent safety standards, shareholders believed they had good cause for
bringing a shareholder derivative suit against Massey's upper
management.4 1 The shareholder plaintiffs sued directors and executives to
recoup losses from delayed coal production, wrongful death suits, and for
loss of shareholder value.42 In his opinion, Judge Strine explained why
shareholders would want to bring a derivative suit, stating, "[t]he Derivative
Claims are at best a way for Massey to offset some of the Disaster Fall-Out
35 Giovanni Russonello, The Coal Truth: Massey Had Worst Mine Fatality Record Even
Before April Disaster, INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING WORKSHOP (Nov.23, 2010),
http://investigativereportingworkshop.org/investigations/coal-truth/story/massey-had-worst-mine-
fatality-record-even-april-d/.
36 id
37 id.
38 MCATEER ET AL., supra note 1, at 96.
39 Id. at 94-95.
40 Howard Berkes, Court Papers Signal Concern Over W. Va. Mining Company's Safety
Record, NPR (May 25, 2011, 9:38 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/05/25/
136641113/court-papers-signal-concern-over-w-va-mine-companys-safety-record. See generally
Answering Brief of Defendants Alpha Natural Resources, Inc. & Mountain Merger Sub, Inc. in
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS,
2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (No. 5430-VCS), 2011 WL 2138264 (highlighting that
Alpha did not counter these allegations in its answer).
41 Verified Shareholder Third Amended Derivative and Class Action Complaint at pt. 2, In re
Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (No. 5430-VCS),
2011 WL 2028545.
42 In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at*l-2 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011).
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by requiring Massey's directors and officers to indemnify the company." 4 3
Taking these factors into consideration, the plaintiffs' expert witness
estimated the value of the derivative action to be between $900 million and
$1.4 billion dollars." The defendants had available up to $95 million in
director and officer insurance (D & 0 insurance) to cover potential
shareholder derivative claims.4 5
In his opinion declining to block the merger, Judge Strine relied on
the reasoning in In re Caremark International Inc., which described the
conditions necessary for director oversight liability.46 He admitted that there
was sufficient evidence in Massey's case to show a breach of fiduciary
duties under Caremark.47 Although acknowledging the merit of the
shareholder derivative suit, he explained his limited role in reviewing the
plaintiffs' attempt for an injunction stating, "I cannot order affirmative
relief at this stage. I can only grant a preliminary injunction against the
Merger.' Citing his concern that the injunction could cause even more
shareholder harm, Judge Strine opted not to issue the injunction, and the
Massey shareholders voted the next day to approve the proposed merger
with Alpha.49
IV. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND SHAREHOLDER
MAXIMIZATION: THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF A DERIVATIVE ACTION
In a shareholder derivative suit, the corporation itself is the real
party of interest and shareholders simply function as representatives of the
corporation and its interests.50 Derivative actions are typically brought
against directors, officers, or controlling shareholders on behalf of the
corporation to recoup losses attributed to a breach of fiduciary duty that
later caused the corporation to lose value.5 Successful suits make the
directors and officers personally liable to the corporation for their actions.52
4 1 Id at *22.
4Id.
4Id. at *28.
4Id. at n.154 ("[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists-will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to [director oversight] liability.") (quoting
In Re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
4 Id. at *21.
48 Id. at n. 205.
49 Clifford Krauss, Shareholders Approve Massey Energy Sale to Alpha, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/business/02coal.html.
50 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5941.10 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2012).
51 Seth Aronson et al., Shareholder Derivative Actions: From Cradle to Grave, in
SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2011, at 325 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 28249, 2011).
52 Id.
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Such liability is usually covered by D & 0 insurance with some exceptions
carved out for actions acted on with scienter.53
Shareholder derivative suits serve two equally valuable purposes
for society. First, derivative suits return to the corporation wrongfully lost
corporate funds from the parties answerable for breaching their fiduciary
duties, which almost always includes management and directors.54 Second,
shareholder derivative suits hold CEOs, controlling shareholders, and
directors accountable.ss Outside of criminal prosecution, a derivative claim
is an effective tool for holding a corporation's management accountable to
its shareholders and, tangentially, to society. 56 Meeting the standard for
proving criminal prosecutions is difficult and some of the available charges
could only result in misdemeanor counts against Massey officials.57 The
threat of personal liability for derivative damages creates a potent tool "to
redress the conduct of a torpid or unfaithful management."58 When a
corporation merges with another during a pending derivative action, this
primary vehicle used to return shareholder value and hold corporate
managers accountable is circumvented.
V. MASSEY AND ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES MERGE
As a result of the disaster and its related fallout, Massey's share
price plunged almost forty-percent during a month long period, reaching
$33.47 on May 6, 2010.59 Alpha first contacted Massey to gauge merger
interest on April 26, 2010, and there were on-and-off discussions until the
merger was publicly announced on January 29, 201 1.60 Alpha would
acquire Massey through exchanging $10 in cash and 1.025 shares of Alpha
stock for each share of Massey stock, in total $69.33 per share, which was a
25% premium over the then market price.61 Additionally, this price was
25% higher than Massey's stock price before the mine disaster on April 5,
2010.62 Massey shareholders approved the merger on June 1, 2011; one day
after Judge Strine issued his decision declining to block the merger.63
At the time of the proposed merger, both Alpha and Massey were
aware of pending shareholder derivative claims and discussed them in the
3 Id. at 424.
54 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-34 (Del. 1993).
5 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244 (Del. 2000).
56 Rales, 634 A.2d at 933.
5 Tavernise & Krauss, supra note 14.
58 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811.
5 Massey Energy Co., Proxy Statement (Sch. 14A) (Apr. 29, 2011).
60 id.
61 Id. at 83.
62 id.63 Tavemnise & Krauss, supra note 14.
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definitive merger agreement." Massey did not assign a value to the
derivative claim, and its legal counsel, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP,
advised that the derivative suit would survive the merger.s Massey
shareholders were given this information in the definitive merger agreement
to decide whether to merge with Alpha:
In response to a question from a director, Cravath advised
the board of directors that it was unclear whether a business
combination would affect any of Massey's pending
derivative claims and that the board should assume that the
derivative claims would survive the proposed business
combination. Cravath also advised the board of directors of
Massey that it should not consider the pending derivative
claims in any decision regarding any potential business
-66combination.
Judge Strine described two problems with Cravath's opinion.67 First, the
board of directors should have retained independent counsel to value the
pending shareholder claims as an asset in the merger.68 Cravath could not
function as independent counsel since Masey's board of directors had
already retained him to defend the directors and executives against the
shareholder derivative suit.69 Second, shareholder derivative suits transfer
as property to the acquiring corporation, but they do not automatically
survive as an ongoing lawsuit because the shareholders no longer have
Massey shares and cannot maintain standing.70
VI. Loss OF SHAREHOLDER STANDING IN MERGERS: DELAWARE'S
CONTINUOUS OWNERSHIP RULE
The general standard in Delaware and other states is that
shareholders, as representative plaintiffs, lose standing in shareholder
derivative suits because they no longer own shares of the acquired
corporation when it is merged with a new corporation.71 The shareholder
must own stock at the time of the suit and continue owning the stock
without interruption throughout the proceedings in order to maintain the
6 Massey Energy Co., supra note 59, at 124.
6 1 Id. at 78.
6 Id.
67 In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at*15 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011).
61 See Massey Energy Co., supra note 59, at 15.
6 In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *15.
70 Id.
7113 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 5981,30 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2012).
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suit.7 2 This is sometimes referred to as the continuous ownership rule.73
There are two exceptions to this rule outlined in Lewis v. Anderson: "(1)
where the merger itself is the subject of a claim of fraud; and (2) where the
merger is in reality a reorganization which does not affect plaintiffs
ownership of the business enterprise."74 This precedent was cited with
approval in Lewis v. Ward.5 More recently, the continuous ownership rule
was reexamined in Lambrecht v. O'Neal, where a similar situation occurred
when Merrill Lynch shareholders lost standing for a derivative action when
Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch. 76 Most federal and state courts
have adopted the continuous ownership rule.77 Part of the rule's rationale is
derived from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and similar state laws,
requiring plaintiffs in a derivative action "fairly and adequately represent
the interests of the shareholders."
In In re Massey, plaintiffs attempted to invoke the fraud exception
of the continuous ownership rule, alleging that the proposed merger would
cause plaintiff shareholders to lose standing necessary to maintain the
derivative action. 79 The fraud exception outlined in Lewis v. Anderson and
restated in Lewis v. Ward requires that the merger be "perpetrated merely to
deprive the plaintiff of derivative standing."80 This fraud exception is
narrow and basically calls for a proverbial smoking gun to prove the merger
was conducted solely to avoid personal liability from derivative suits.81
Judge Strine ruled that it was "highly doubtful" that Massey's directors'
decision to merge with Alpha was merely to avoid personal liability, thus
removing the shareholders' ability to rely on the fraud exception to the
continuous ownership rule.82 Massey's directors were aware of the potential
liability the mine disaster caused and attempted to have Alpha indemnify
them "to the fullest extent permitted by the law."83 This would have
expanded the board of directors' liability coverage to include intentional
72 id.
731d
7 Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 n.10 (Del. 1984).
7s Lewis v. Ward, 852 A.2d 896, 899 (Del. 2004).
76 Lambrecht v. O'Neal, 3 A.3d 277, 284 (Del. 2010).
n Malaika M. Eaton et al., The Continuous Ownership Requirement in Shareholder
Derivative Litigation: Endorsing a Common Sense Application of Sense and Choice-of-Law Principles,
47 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1, 3 (2010) (discussing in length the rationale and application of continuous
ownership rule).
78 Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1).
7 Opening Brief in Support of Co-Lead Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 43,
In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (No. 5430-VCS),
2011 WL 2138265.
so Lewis v. Ward, 852 A.2d 896, 899 (Del. 2004) (citing Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040
(Del. 1984)).
8 See id. at 903.
82 In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at*2 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011).
13 Id. at *16.
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acts, which were not included in their current indemnification agreement
with Massey. 84 Alpha described the proposal as "obnoxious" and declined
to adopt it in the merger agreement." In the end, Alpha agreed to extend the
same D & 0 insurance coverage, which provides some personal liability
protection against pending suits, to Massey's board of directors for an
additional six years.
Plaintiffs attempted to apply Arkansas Teacher Retirement System
v. Caiafa (Countrywide), where plaintiffs argued that the fraud exception of
the continuous ownership rule had been modified. Although the court
found that Countrywide had not merged merely to fraudulently circumvent
the derivative suit, the court suggested a more complex method of applying
the fraud exception. The court stated that fraudulent actions performed
prior to a merger could be taken into account in determining if the fraud
exception of the continuous ownership rule applied:
As [Bank of America] amassed its Countrywide
stockholdings, these directors might have seen [Bank of
America] as a potential fiduciary White Knight. That is,
after allegedly intentionally engaging in fraudulent conduct
that caused the stock price to plummet near bankruptcy,
Countrywide directors would understandably seek an
acquirer to effect a merger that would extinguish potential
derivative claims during such a period of upheaval that
they would have few alternatives. Whether this plausible
scenario reflects this board's single, cohesive plan or
merely ties together, like patchwork, a snowballing pattern
of fraudulent conduct and conscious neglect, the result is
the same and would not fairly constitute a proper discharge
of the fiduciary duties of directors of a Delaware
89
corporation.
Stating the continuous ownership rule and its two exceptions were settled
Delaware law, Lambrecht v. O'Neal foreclosed the expanded application of
this exception shortly after the Countrywide opinion was issued.90 The fraud
exception to the continuous ownership rule should be strictly interpreted
" Id
85 Id.
s6 Massey Energy Co., supra note 59, at 16.
" In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *30 n.199.
88 See Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Caiafa, 996 A.2d 321, 333 (Del. 2010).
" Id at 323.
9 Lambrecht v. O'Neal, 3 A.3d 277, 293 n.36 (Del. 2010).
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and not consider any tangential but material personal benefit for directors
who do not conduct a merger merely to eliminate derivative claims.9 1
Alternatively, other states have interpreted the standing requirement
for derivative suits differently than the continuous ownership rule.9 2 The
Alabama Supreme Court allows a derivative action to continue on the
grounds that lack of standing should not be applied to abolish an existing
substantive right of action.93 In Shelton v. Thompson, the court stated: "By
their blind adherence to the absolutism of the 'stockholder status'
prerequisite, these cases use 'lack of standing' to abolish the remedy. We
refuse to adopt such a rule." 94 Over twenty years ago, California relaxed the
continuous ownership rule, creating the contemporaneous ownership rule.95
Contemporaneous ownership allows a shareholder who brings a derivative
suit against a corporation to continue that suit after the shareholder's
corporation merges with another corporation. However, this rule was
overruled in favor of the more strict bright line rule of continuous
ownership.97 In Alford v. Shaw, the North Carolina Supreme Court allowed
a shareholder who did not maintain continuous ownership throughout the
suit to proceed with a derivative claim on the basis that the defendants'
actions deprived the plaintiff of standing. Pennsylvania's Drain v.
Covenant Life Insurance Co. allowed a shareholder to maintain standing
after a merger. 99 The Drain court ruled that the shareholders "did not lose
standing to maintain their derivative action where the involuntary
disposition of their interests . . . was allegedly the result of the defendants'
wrongdoing in the challenged merger."' 00
The United States Supreme Court relaxed the rule in Gollust v.
Mendell and allowed shareholders to ignore the continuous ownership rule
for claims based on short-swing profits that violated § 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.101 The Supreme Court stated that
shareholders are not required to have ownership when a violation occurs,
but ownership must be maintained throughout the suit.10 2 Claims would be
allowed even if the shareholder's interest was exchanged for shares in the
9' See id. at 288; see also In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *18.
92 Eaton et al., supra note 77, at 5.
9 Shelton v. Thompson, 544 So. 2d 845, 848 (Ala. 1989).
9 4 Id. at 849.
9 CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b).
96 Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 410,414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
9 Grosset v. Wenaas, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 129, 145 (Cal. 2008); see also Eaton et al., supra note
77, at 9-10 (discussing the rationale and application of the continuous ownership rule generally and for
derivate suits).
9 Alford v. Shaw, 398 S.E.2d 445, 451-52 (N.C. 1990).
9 Drain v. Covenant Life Ins. Co., 685 A.2d 119, 126-27 (Pa. 1996).
1oo Id.
10 Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 123 (1991).
102 Id. at 126-27.
2012-2013] 171
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L. [Vol. 5 No. 1
acquiring corporation during a merger. 03 While these outliers do exist, the
continuous ownership rule and its exceptions are the general black letter
law for Delaware corporations and most other jurisdictions.'
VII. IMPACT OF MERGERS ON OTHER DERIVATIVE SUITS
The loss of standing for the Massey shareholders as a result of the
merger with Alpha is not the first time a derivative suit has been dismissed.
In the food and natural resource fields, multiple cases have yielded similar
results. Recent mergers demonstrate the important impact of a merger on
derivative actions, for example: Bank of America's purchase of
Countrywide;'0o Bank of America's purchase of Merrill Lynch;'06 and JP
Morgan's buyout of Bear Stearns.10 7 Each shareholder with current or
potential derivative claims lost standing as a result of these mergers. 08
Using the Massey disaster as a springboard, there are many reasons
shareholder derivative actions during mergers are important to natural
resource and agricultural corporations. First, natural resource companies
can have corporate governance problems with a very high risk of
catastrophic societal losses, including the loss of life, health, monetary
value, and an environment that can trigger large company losses.' 09 If a
breach of fiduciary duty caused these losses, the shareholder derivative suit
claims have the potential to be large. Examples of past corporate
governance failures within natural resources and agriculture companies
include the Fukishima nuclear power plant meltdown in Japan,"l0 Archer
Daniels Midland's price-fixing scandal,"' the Enron scandal,1 2 Tyson
Foods' option back dating scandal,113 Diamond Foods' walnut crop
payments scandal,"14 and the BP gulf oil spill."'5 The risk of high loss raises
103 Id. at 118.
104 Eaton et al., supra note 77, at 23.
1os Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Caiafa, 996 A.2d 321, 322-23 (Del. 2010).
06o In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 597 F. Supp. 2d 427, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
107 In re Bear Stearns Cos., 763 F. Supp. 2d 423, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
'0' Id. at 535; In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 597 F. Supp. 2d at 429; Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys., 996
A.2d at 322-23.
' See supra part III.
110 Mail Foreign Service, Exclusion Zone Around Stricken Japanese Nuclear Plant Widen
Over Fears Reactor Core May be Cracked, MAIL ONLINE (Mar. 25, 2011, 1:28 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1 369993/Japan-nuclear-meltdown-Fukushima-plant-exclusion-
zone-widened-reactor-fears.html.
". JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN: THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER
DANIELS MIDLAND, 27-29 (2000).
"2 Ramona Schindelheim, Enron Faces Bankruptcy After Merger Nixed, ABC NEWS (Nov.
28, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87524&page=1.
113 LaCroix, supra note 7.
114 Nanette Byrnes, P.J. Huffstutter & Mihir Dalal Insight: Seeds of Trouble Sown at
Diamond Foods Years Ago, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2012, 1:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/
03/19/us-diamond-tax-idUSBRE821OAQ20120319.
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the potential value of shareholders' derivative claims. Second, shareholders
should be aware of the risk a merger presents to maintaining shareholder
derivative suits and should understand suits are valuable assets that should
be priced into a merger.
VIII. TRANSFERRING CONTROL TO THE SUCCESSOR ENTITY AND
DOUBLE DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
Under Delaware corporate law, a shareholder derivative suit is the
property of the corporation and is transferred as an asset to the newly
merged corporate entity.' 16 Only the acquiring corporation's board of
directors, which in this Note is Alpha, can continue to pursue a derivative
action against the acquired corporation's board of directors and
executives. 117 While the derivative action technically survives, the board of
directors of the successor corporation must first approve the continued
action against the merged company.' 18 From a practical standpoint, it is not
likely that an acquiring corporation like Alpha would work extensively with
an acquired corporation's board of directors to negotiate a merger and then
immediately sue the very same board of directors in a derivative suit.1 9
As Judge Strine characterized in the conclusion of his opinion,
Massey shareholders could have prevented the merger and preserved
shareholder standing for the derivative suit by voting against the proposed
merger.12 0 The proxy statements for the definitive merger agreement lay
bare the financial impact of the merger on the derivative suit.121 The
definitive merger agreement states that plaintiffs would lose standing in the
derivative suits because of the merger; Alpha's board of directors would
decide whether or not to pursue the claims; the value of the derivative
claims may be lost as a result of the merger; the newly merged entity would
share in any subsequent recovery; and a resulting 46% dilution of Massey
shareholder ownership in the suit.12 2 It also states: "Since the Massey board
of directors assumed that the derivative claims would survive the merger,
the Massey board of directors did not consider this potential interest in
evaluating and negotiating the merger agreement and the merger, and in
recommending to the Massey stockholders that the merger agreement be
"5 Adam Martin, BP Mostly, But Not Entirely, to Blame for Gulf Spill, ATLANTIC WIRE
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/national/2011/09/bp-mostly-not-entirely-blame-gulf-
spill/42470/.
116 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (West 2012).
" Lambrecht v. O'Neal, 3 A.3d 277, 282 (Del. 2010).
"
8 id.
" In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *26 n.173 (Del. Ch. May
31, 2011).
12 0 Id. at *32.
121 Massey Energy Co., supra note 59, at 50.
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adopted."l 23 This transfer of control is precisely why Massey should have
fully considered all of the possibilities surrounding the derivative claims,
including that the Massey shareholders could lose standing in these suits.124
Because of this, these shareholder derivative claims have value but can no
longer benefit Massey shareholders because the asset changed hands. 25 A
similar analogy would be ignoring the value of a barn when purchasing a
farm (which includes both the barn and land) because it will be transferred
with the land. While they are not separate prices, the value of barn is
certainly factored into the farm's final sale price.
The last and final option available to hold Massey directors and
executives accountable and maximize shareholder value is a double
derivative action. In Lambrecht, the Delaware Supreme Court explained the
two types of derivative actions:
Double derivative actions generally fall into two distinct
categories. The first are lawsuits that are brought originally
as double-derivative actions on behalf of a parent
corporation that has a pre-existing, wholly owned
subsidiary at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct at
the subsidiary level. In this category, no intervening merger
takes place. The second category involves cases, such as
this, where the action is brought originally as a standard
derivative action on behalf of a corporation that thereafter
is acquired by another corporation in an intervening stock-
for-stock merger.12 6
For purposes of this Note, only double derivative suits during mergers are
discussed. After a merger, the shareholder derivative suit is transferred
along with all other assets to the acquiring corporation.127 The board of
directors then can determine whether it should continue the derivative suit
against the acquired company's directors and executives.128 Should the
board decide not to continue the suit, current shareholders of the successor
company can sue their own board in a derivative suit to force them to
continue the suit against the now subsidiary.12 9
Courts have pointed to the double derivative action as an
appropriate remedy when standing is lost.13 0 However, relying on double
12 31 d. at 16.
124 See id. at 50.
125 In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *24-25.
126 Lambrecht v. O'Neal, 3 A.3d 277, 282 (Del. 2010).
127 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §259(a) (West 2012).
128 Lambrecht, 3 A.3d at 282.
129 id.
130 Id. at 286.
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derivative actions to continue derivative suits after mergers is plagued with
"a thicket of procedures that even expert litigators struggle to
understand."' 3 ' The process for determining standing in a double derivative
action can be complex and dependent on the structure of the merger.132 It
also reduces the potential recovery to existing shareholders.'33 In a cash
only merger, the acquired shareholders will not receive any part of the
suit's recovery and the shareholders of the merged company will receive
the full benefit. 13 4 In a share for share merger, the combination of both
companies' shareholders in the successor corporation dilutes the potential
recovery of the suit.' There is also a potential risk the board of directors
will not be impartial when deciding to proceed with the derivative suit.'13 It
is up to the newly merged corporation to bring its own suit against the
former directors who negotiated the merger in the first place, a situation
ripe for potential conflicts of interest.137 While the double derivative
approach provides a last resort to shareholders who have lost standing from
a merger, it is by no means perfect; it is riddled with complicated
procedures, dilution of shareholder value, and a delayed timeline for
recovery.
IX. METHODS OF VALUING DERIVATIVE CLAIMS
For most mergers, a derivative action does not rise to the level of a
material asset that would affect the transaction because it is of relatively
small value compared to the rest of the assets.' 38 However, derivative
claims can be quite large and can possibly impact fair valuation of merged
assets when a breach of fiduciary duties at natural resource and agricultural
corporations causes catastrophic losses. 39 For example, the potential losses
from the Massey coal mine disaster, or of a nuclear power plant similar to
Fukishima, create large potential shareholder derivative claims to recoup
large losses. In Judge Strine's analysis considering whether the derivative
suit is of material value in In Re Massey, he focuses on Alpha's
characterizing it as a material asset or as potential for "loss-offsetting" the
131 Steven M. Davidoff, The Logic in Refusing to Block Massey's Sale, DEALBK (June 3,
2011, 10:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/03/the-logic-in-refusing-to-block-masseys-
sale/.
132 Mary Elizabeth Anderson, Commentary, Shareholder Litigation, TRANSACTIONS: TENN.
J. BUS. L. 223, 224-25 (2011).
1 In re Massey Energy Co., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *30 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2011).
3 See id.
36 Lambrecht v. O'Neal, 3 A.3d 277, 282 (Del. 2010).
13 Id at 282.
' In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *28.
139 See generally id. (detailing derivative suits in aftermath of Upper Big Branch coal mine
explosion and Massey's failure to value derivative suits).
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Upper Big Branch fallout.14 0 Judge Strine states that "[a]ny board
negotiating the sale of a corporation should attempt to value and get full
consideration for all of the corporation's material assets."l 4 1 The crux of the
issue is whether a shareholder derivative suit is a material asset in the eyes
of the board of directors of Massey or Alpha. Although Judge Strine
discusses whether Alpha would consider the derivative suit an asset, one
should consider whether Massey itself would value the suit as a material
asset when it negotiates its own sale.14 2 As a stand-alone entity, Massey
would likely consider the suit a material asset for recouping shareholder
losses as a result of the mining catastrophe.143 Alpha, when considering the
other assets gained from the merger, would have less incentive to value the
claim as a material asset because of other, larger assets gained in the
merger."4 Even though Judge Strine found that Alpha could use the
derivative suit to regain value lost, he was hesitant to label the derivative
claim as an asset because it was directly tied to the fallout liability of the
disaster. 145 While this ensures there are assets for miners' wrongful death
claims, the fact that it can be used to recoup losses implies that it is an asset
with value.14 6
In the definitive merger agreement, Massey and Alpha submitted a
pro forma statement breaking down the estimated value of Massey's assets
combined in the merger.14 7 This assignment of value to Massey's assets
helped shareholders to better understand if the merger properly valued the
corporation's assets.148 Massey's board of directors "did not engage in a
valuation of the Derivative Claims individually, and at most assumed either
that their value was baked into the total purchase price to be paid by an
acquiror, or that the Derivative Claims had no independent value to an
acquiror. "l49 Had the Massey board of directors attached a value to the
shareholder derivative suit in the proxy statement, Massey shareholders
would be better able to understand the claim's potential value. The merger
agreement did explain, however, the impact of the merger on the derivative
suit in detail.' 50
It is possible to attach value to pending derivative claims, and a
number of methodologies have been used to evaluate the worth of such a
14 0 I re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at*3.
141 i.
142 id.
14 Id. at *22.
'" See id. (explaining that the value one would place on a derivative claim would be
immaterial when compared to the value being paid in the merger).
.. Id. at *23.
46 id.
147 Masey Energy Co., supra note 59, at 179.
148 See id.
149 lIn re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at*15.
15o Massey Energy Co., supra note 59, at 50.
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corporate asset in a merger.151 The Delaware court stated in Kohls v. Duthie
that "[w]hile plaintiffs will likely lose standing to maintain the derivative
claim once the merger is effected, it will be possible to value that claim in
the context of an appraisal action."l 52 Vice Chancellor Lamb performed a
valuation analysis that calculated the value of the claim through multiplying
the probability of success on the merits by the likely amount of a favorable
recovery, and subtracting from that result the reasonable costs incurred in
prosecuting the claim.15 3 Shareholders may apply this valuation analysis in
determining the value of a derivative claim where there is a breach of
fiduciary duties. 5 4 Certainly, as Judge Strine noted, this simplistic
valuation model can become rife with uncertainties that hamper a court's
ability to value the claims. 55 However, this method is much better than the
Massey board of directors stating that the claim's value is "baked into" the
merger proposal or, concurrently and illogically, that the claim has no
value. 56 In In re Massey, Judge Strine suggested another method of valuing
shareholder derivative suits; the board of directors should seek to obtain
independent counsel to determine what consideration should be given for
pending derivative claims.'15 Soon to be acquired corporations could also
ask investment firms or legal experts to evaluate the derivative claims to
decide whether the claim has value, and whether it was properly valued in
the merger.
X. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST & BOARD OF DIRECTORS' PERSONAL
LIABILITY
Even though Massey's board of directors knew about the
shareholder derivative suit and specifically asked how the merger would
impact the suit, Judge Strine ruled that the board did not have a strong
enough conflict of interest to invoke Delaware's alternative standards of
review for corporate business decisions.159 In Delaware, and most other
states, corporate actors are protected under the business judgment rule when
there are no conflicts of interest present.160 Aronson v. Lewis defined how a
director could be conflicted: "From the standpoint of interest, this means
that directors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction nor expect to
1s1 See In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176478, at *15; Kohls v. Duthie, 765 A.2d 1274, 1289 (Del.
Ch. 2000); Bomarko, Inc. v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1189 (Del. Ch. 1999).
52 Kohls, 765 A.2d at 1289.
us Bomarko, 794 A.2d at 189.
1
54 id.
'In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *31.
"
6 Id. at *15.
'" Id.
"
8Massey Energy Co., supra note 59, at C-1, D-1.
'
9 In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *16.
160 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
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derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as
opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all
stockholders generally."161 When considering the merger as a whole, it is
much more difficult to determine if there is a clear personal conflict of
interest for directors related to the derivative suit losing standing.162
Massey directors attempted to have Alpha completely indemnify
their personal liability for derivative actions in the draft merger
documents.'6 3 Alpha rebuffed the proposal to completely indemnify the
directors, opting to provide the same D & 0 insurance to the extent
previously agreed.16 4 The fact that the personal liability of the directors was
negotiated during the merger demonstrates that both parties understood its
value to Massey and its directors. 165 Even though there were negotiations
regarding liability, the asset was not priced into the merger.' 66 This raises
the risk of a breach of fiduciary duty for directors receiving a personal
benefit of reduced liability as a result of the merger. The main argument
plaintiffs used in these shareholder derivative suits is that the directors are
willing to agree to a lower price in order to minimize their own personal
liability in the derivative action.167 The finding of a proverbial smoking gun
for the narrow fraud exception during mergers is difficult and usually
inoperable in court.16 8
While the minimization of personal liability usually is not the main
purpose of a merger, it certainly provides some potential benefit to
directors.19 Instead of requiring that the directors who seek a merger do so
"merely to deprive shareholders of standing to bring a derivative action," 70
courts should recognize that the conflict of interest related to derivative
claims losing standing, while not controlling, could impair director
decision-making. Therefore, good corporate governance should either price
the derivative claim into the merger by valuing the derivative suit or
expanding the exception to the continuous ownership rule. Past litigators
unsuccessfully sought to expand the fraud exception in Countrywide and
161 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746
A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(iv) (West 2011) (explaining that
there may be provisions in a certificate of incorporation that limit the personal liability of a director for
breach of a fiduciary duty, but such provision shall not limit liability for any transaction where the
director derives an improper personal benefit).
162 In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *2.
161 Id. at *16.
'6 "Id. at * 17.
165 Davidoff, supra note 131.
166 In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *24.
161 See In re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479; Davidoff, supra note 131.
'
6 8 In re Massey,2011 WL 2176479, at *17.
1o Lewis v. Ward, 852 A.2d 896, 899, 902.
178
VALUING DERIVATIVE SUITS
there is no indication that this black letter standard will change.171
Therefore, the only current way to ensure maximum shareholder value and
to potentially prevent board of director conflicts of interest is to force such
institutions to affirmatively value the derivative claim in a merger.
Currently, to pursue a double derivative action, a shareholder must prove
that the successor corporation is not maximizing shareholder value in
continuing the derivative action against the acquired directors and
executives. 172 Through assigning a value to the claim in the merger, it is
easier to make a double derivative claim because the successor corporation
paid value for the derivative claim in the merger and, therefore, has a
fiduciary duty to reclaim that capital outlay or disclose it as a loss.
XI. CONCLUSION: MAPPING A BETTER WAY TO
VALUE SHAREHOLDER SUITS IN MERGERS
The continuous ownership rule for derivative actions during
mergers, while arguably unfair to shareholders of acquired companies, has
been almost uniformly enforced to remove shareholder standing in
derivative actions. Instead of attempting to rectify this potential unfairness
through modifying the strict fraud exception or reducing the continuous
ownership requirement, acquired corporations should proactively price and
evaluate derivative actions as an asset to be purchased in a merger. This is
much simpler than creating a "litigation trust" as the In re Massey plaintiffs
proposed, and the acquiring company remains able to gain ownership of the
suit in the merger to loss-offset fallout liabilities.173 It also is less risky than
bringing a double derivative suit against the successor corporation.
Derivative actions should be priced into the merger to mitigate the
risk of the breach of fiduciary duties related to asset mispricing, as well as
reducing conflicts of interest impacting decision-making, and to ensure full
disclosure to shareholders regarding the proper value of their assets. As in
the Massey-Alpha merger, there is a high likelihood that the derivative
action will not be priced into the merger and shareholders will, at minimum,
not be fully apprised of the value of their assets, or at a maximum, receive
less than market value for their shares. Even a double derivative action,
which is usually recommended as a last resort remedy, dilutes existing
shareholders' value. Additionally, the second social goal of shareholder
derivative actions as a method of corporate accountability is diminished
through mergers. Without a fair valuation of the claim, the acquiring
corporation has a reduced incentive to continue the suit as a double
17' Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Caiafa, 996 A.2d 321, 323 (Del. 2010). (referencing the
snowball effect or a cohesive plan to initiate a merger to personally benefit from lost standing of
derivative suits).
112 Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1991).
173 n re Massey, 2011 WL 2176479, at *31-32.
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derivative action against the acquired company's corporate management.
This analysis is important to food and natural resource companies because
corporate disasters in those industries have large potential losses. At the
time of the definitive merger agreement in January 2011, the combined
value of the companies would have been $8.5 billion. 174 A year and a half
later in August 2012, the combined value of the companies plummeted to
$1.5 billion.17 ' As Alpha stock continues to decline, there is increasing
attractiveness of continuing the shareholder derivative claim against
Massey's directors and executives to compensate for the liabilities of the
Upper Big Branch fallout. Only time will tell if Alpha, or its shareholders in
a double derivative suit, will continue the suit against Massey's former
directors and executives, but Massey's original shareholders will never
recoup the entire recovery of such a claim.
174 Press Release, Alpha Natural Resources, Alpha Natural Resources and Massey Energy
Agree To $8.5 Billion Combination (Jan. 29, 2011) available at http://alnr.client.shareholder.com/
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaselD=546291.
1s Historical Prices: Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., GOOGLE FINANCE
https://www.google.com/finance/historical?q=NYSE:ANR (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (considering stock
price of $6.84 at end of August 14, 2012 and 220.28 Million shares outstanding).
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